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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Daniel Ehrlick appeals from his judgment of conviction entered upon a jury finding him
guilty of first degree murder and failure to report a death to law enforcement. He asserts that in
light of the numerous erroneous evidentiary rulings, the prejudicial nature of the evidence
erroneously admitted, the misconduct committed by the prosecutor, and the highly circumstantial
nature of the evidence against him, the errors either individually or cumulative deprived him of
his right to a fair trial and this Court must vacate his convictions. This Reply Brief is necessary
to address the State's assertions to the contrary.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Ehrlick's Appellant's Brief and need not be repeated in detail in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

The State makes numerous factually incorrect

statements in its Respondent's Brief and these misstatements will be clarified and corrected, as
necessary, within the section for which these facts are relevant.

1

ISSUES
1.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by allowing FBI Agent Martin to testify that
eye witnesses who saw R.M. alive and well on July 24, 2009, were not credible?
Did the district court err in admitting State's Exhibit 26-A, a model of R.M. 's head, as the
exhibit was not relevant, could not assist the jury, and was overly prejudicial?

3.

Did the district court err by admitting highly prejudicial Rule 404(b) evidence that was
not relevant to any issue other than propensity?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the State's Second Motion in
Limine regarding the presentation of evidence of Mr. Ehrlick's alleged attempt to alter
and/or influence the testimony of Ms. Jenkins?

5.

Did the district court err in granting the State's Fifth Motion in Limine regarding the
presentation of evidence of Mr. Ehrlick's emergency room visit on July 31, 2009?

6.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing Samantha Burnett to testify that
others told her that they had not heard of a birthday party and that, in her lay opinion, the
story of R.M. going to a birthday party did not make sense to her?
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Ehrlick's request to question
Detective Brechweld as to whether K.D. told him that there was talk of a birthday party
on July 24 th as the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather,
the statement was offered to rebut the State's theory that Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins
made up the birthday party story?

8.

Did the district court err in allowing the State to question Mr. Ehrlick regarding a custody
agreement for R.A. and in allowing the custody agreement to be admitted as an exhibit
although it was later withdrawn by the district court as improperly admitted?

9.

Did the State violate Mr. Ehrlick's right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct?

10.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Ehrlick's Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial?1

Mr. Ehrlick will not be providing a response to the issue of cumulative error because the State's argument on this
issue is unremarkable.
1

2

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing FBI Agent Martin To Testify That Eye
Witnesses Who Saw R.M. Alive And Well On July 24, 2009, Were Not Credible
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the district court erred by allowing FBI Agent Mary Martin to

testify that she believed eye witnesses who saw R.M. alive and well on July 24, 2009, were not
credible. Mr. Ehrlick's arguments in support of this claim are contained in the Appellant's Brief
and need not be repeated herein in detail. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.15-21.) In response, the
State offers a new justification for Agent Martin's testimony, i.e., to establish the thoroughness
of the investigation, and the State further argues, under the incorrect standard of review, that any
error was harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-13.) For the reasons stated below, the State's
arguments are without merit.
B.

Defense Counsel's Opening Statement Did Not Make The Thoroughness Of The Police
Investigation A Fact Of Consequence
"Whether a fact is 'of consequence' or material is determined by its relationship to the

legal theories presented by the parties." State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 364 (2010) (citing

State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008)). The State asserts that the thoroughness of the
police investigation was a fact of consequence based upon defense counsel's purportedly arguing
to the jury that law enforcement's focus on Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins "skewed their
investigation." (Respondent's Brief, p.8 (citing Tr., p.1316, Ls.9-23; p.1318, Ls.1-10 (portions
of defense counsel's opening statements).) The State appears to imply that Agent Martin's
testimony was somehow necessary to rebut a legal theory proffered by the defense that the
investigation was not thorough. The State misrepresents the record.

3

Defense counsel did not imply that the lack of a thorough investigation was a defense;
rather, defense counsel simply reminded the jurors that, regardless of how thorough the
investigation was, it was for them to decide what occurred and, who was credible. During its
opening statement, the prosecutor raised the specter of its investigation arguing,
Ladies and gentlemen, that 911 call set off what became the largest
missing child investigation in this part of the State. Not only did Boise City
Police Department throw the entirety of all available resources they could spare
into finding [R.M.], but teams of the top investigators and detectives from every
local agency: From Garden City, Meridian City, Ada County sheriff's office, the
State police, probation and parole, the FBI and national missing children experts
all poured into Boise with 2.000 members of this community who all were trying
to do one thing, and that was find [R.M.].
(Tr., p.1266, Ls.8-19.)

The prosecutor then spoke of the commencement of the criminal

investigation including officers questioning Mr. Ehrlick, "six days after the investigation began,"
and four days prior to R.M.'s body being discovered. (Tr., p.1266, L.20 - p.1269, L.10.) The
prosecutor repeatedly referred to law enforcement's interactions with Mr. Ehrlick, including
statements he made during the investigation, and claimed "the State maintains that Danny
Ehrlick admitted to everything that you need to know that he did this." (Tr., p.1284, L.4 p.1292, L.23.)
In its opening, defense counsel stated on multiple occasions that it was jury's duty, not
law enforcement's, to decide what occurred and who was credible. (Tr., p.1314, Ls.15-16 ("And
again, you're going to get information that will help you make that decision. You will be able to
decide ... "); p.1315, Ls.17-19 ("It's not relevant what the police officers think. What's relevant
is what you think. And don't let them substitute their judgment for your judgment"); p.1316,
Ls.5-8 ("And so again, it will be your decision as to who you believe and what you believe and
ultimately to make a decision on what happened to this boy. But more importantly, who did
it.").) Counsel argued,

4

The procedure of a trial, you already know this but I just remind you, that the
State gets to go first. It's the power of the government, again. As you evaluate
this testimony, it is fair for you to understand that the government did bring to
bear a great deal of resources, at least initially, ostensibly to recover and find the
boy but, ultimately, to accuse and convict. And it's fair for you to evaluate that
marshalling of effort. I ask you to do that in the sense that you get to make the
decision, they don't. And again, we are hopeful that you will hear all this and
you'll understand, with this onslaught of behaviors by the police and activities,
that puts in context some of the things you hear.
(Tr., p.1317, L.22-p.318, L.10. (emphasis added.) The defense did not posit a legal theory that
the State's investigation was "skewed" or otherwise inadequate as the State now claims; rather,
defense counsel argued that regardless of the thoroughness of the investigation, it was the jury's
duty to determine what transpired and who was credible, not law enforcement's or the
prosecutor's. (Tr., p.1317, L.22, - p.1318, L.10.) The State's assertion that defense counsel
opened the door for the admission of Agent Martin's testimony about the credibility of
witnesses, by correctly informing the jurors that it was their job, not law enforcement's job, to
make decisions about the credibility of witnesses, is absurd.

C.

Agent Martin's Testimony Was Offered By The State Specifically To Discredit Eye
Witness Accounts Of R.M. Being Seen Alive And Well On July 24, 2009
The State asserts that "Agent Martin's testimony was not offered to show the credibility

of any witness or potential witness but to show the police response and thoroughness of the
investigation of potential leads." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) The State's proffered justification is
factually erroneous.
Prior to asking the specific questions that drew the objections asserted as erroneously
overruled on this appeal, the prosecutor asked Agent Martin what her "ultimately conclusion"
was regarding R.M. being seen in multiple places on the 24t\ and this question drew a hearsay
objection from the defense. (Tr. P.4442, L.14 - p.4443, L.8.) The State argued, "it's not offered
for the truth; it's more offered to show that all of these different sightings can't be credible, can't
5

be believed, so for the falsity of the statements and not the truth of anything." (Tr., p.4443,
When the defense argued that Agent Martin's conclusions are irrelevant and that it is
not proper for her to offer an opinion as to whether people were telling the truth, the State
responded by asserting,
On the hearsay argument, hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. We're not trying to prove the
truth of the matter asse1ied by any of these statements.
Frankly, it's been the state's position from the beginning that [R.M.]
was never outside on the 24 th . Regardless, this witness talked to a number of
different people, and I think she could testify that given all the information that
she had received, [R.M.] couldn't possibly have been in all of those places. I
don't see how that's hearsay.
(Tr., p.4443, L.24

p.4445, L.l 1. (emphasis added).) Contrary to the State's appellate theory,

the prosecutor acknowledged that the very purpose of soliciting Agent Martin's testimony was to
show the jury that there were no credible sightings ofR.M. on July 24, 2009.
Additionally, the prosecutor did not stop by merely asking Agent Martin about who she
interviewed and how many reports she read; rather, the prosecutor specifically solicited Agent
Martin's opinion on the credibility of those who informed law enforcement that they saw R.M.
alive and well on that day. (Tr., p.4454, Ls.18-20 ("And based upon your investigation - were
you able to determine whether or not that was a credible lead or a credible last sighting?");
p.4456, L.25 - p.4457, L.2 ("And did you determine whether or not either of them provided a
credible last sighting of [R.M.]?"); p.4457, L.25 - p.4458, L.2 ("And were you able to find what
you believed were any credible sightings of [R.M.] there at the pool?").) When referring to
Agent Martin's testimony during closing arguments, the prosecutor did not argue her testimony
counters any perceived claim about a lack of a thorough investigation; instead, the prosecutor
argued they Agent Martin's investigation proved there were no credible sightings of R.M. on the
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day he was reported missing:
There was no credible sighting of that child outside on July 24 th .
You heard Mary Martin with the FBI. You heard from Detective Rawson.
They followed up on lead after lead after lead after lead, and their sole purpose
was to find a credible sighting of [R.M.] outside on the 24t\ and they didn't find a
single one.
(Tr., p.6295, Ls.18-25.) The State's assertion that Agent Martin's testimony was offered to show
the thoroughness of the police investigation is factually erroneous.
D.

Agent Martin's Opinion About The Credibility Of Eye Witnesses Was Not Relevant To
Any Purported Challenge To The Thoroughness Of The Police Investigation
Assuming the thoroughness of the police investigation in this case was somehow a fact of

consequence for the jury to decide, Agent Martin's opinion about the credibility of eye witnesses
who saw R.M. alive and well on July 24, 2009, is simply not relevant to the jury's consideration
of this issue. The prosecutor did, in fact, ask Agent Martin (and numerous other witnesses) what
she did to assist in this investigation. (Tr., p.4434, L.4 - p.4441, L.19.) Her testimony that she
reviewed reports and witness statements and interviewed witnesses herself demonstrated the
thoroughness of her investigation. (Tr., p.4439, L.3 - p.4440, L. 1 l.)

Her conclusions that

witnesses were not credible did not assist the jury in determining whether or not they thought she
did a good job.
E.

The State's Argument, If Accepted By This Court, Would Effectively Overrule Almaraz
and Perry And Create A Special Rule Allowing Law Enforcement Personnel To Opine On
The Credibility Of Witnesses
In State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 301 P.3d 242 (2013), an opinion which became final

less than four months prior to the State filing its Respondent's Brief in this case, 2 this Court
stated, "Expert testimony that only vouches for the credibility of another witness 'encroaches

The State's Petition for Rehearing in Almaraz was denied on May 31, 2013, while the State filed its Respondent's
Brief in this case on September 6, 2013.

2
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upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations, and therefore
not "assist the trier of fact" as required by Rule 702. '" Id., 154 Idaho at

301 P.3d at

(quoting State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525 (2003).) The Almaraz Court recognized,
Expert testimony that only vouches for the credibility of another witness
"encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility
determinations, and therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact' as required by
Rule 702." State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235 (2003).
However, expert opinion testimony that is admissible under LR.E. 702 "is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact." l.R.E. 704. Indeed, we have routinely held that "an expert's opinion, in a
proper case, is admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would
require the expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of
disputed evidence. To venture beyond that point, however, is to usurp the
jury's function." Perry, 139 Idaho at 525, 81 P.3d at 1235 (quoting State v.
Hester, 114 ldaho 688,696, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988)).

Id, I 54 Idaho at

301 P.3d at 257-258. (emphasis added). The State attempts to get around

this clear holding by emphasizing the word "only," suggesting that the Almaraz opinion does not
preclude expert testimony that vouches for the credibility of another witness provided another
justification could also be given for the vouching. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-10.) This Court
should reject this suggestion.
If police officers, sheriff's deputies, or federal agents are allowed to testify that a witness
was either credible or not credible in order to explain what they did next in their investigation, the
fundamental principle that Almaraz and Perry are based upon - the vital and exclusive role of the
jury in making credibility determinations - would be rendered meaningless. The State suggests
that this Court adopt an exception that would swallow the rule. A police officer would always be
allowed to render an opinion on the credibility of a witness whenever the credibility of that
witness was at issue, provided that credibility determination was made in the course of the
officer's investigation. There is simply no legal justification for allowing an officer to testify that,
based upon her training and experience, the complaining witness was telling the truth and the
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suspect was lying, and therefore she completed her investigation by arresting the defendant.
However, if this Court were to adopt the State's reasoning such a rule would necessarily
also apply to defense investigators. A State may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a
witness to take a stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his or her testimony. Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54 (1987). If this Court adopts the reasoning underpinning the State's
argument - that a witness may opine on the credibility of another witness provided doing so is a
material part of his or her "investigation" - defense investigators necessarily would be able to
provide their own opinion as to the credibility of witnesses, less the Court adopt a rule that would
arbitrarily exclude this "material" testimony. It would arguably constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel for a defense counsel not to hire an investigator to investigate an alleged sexual assault
on a child, for example, in order to provide testimony that, in the investigator's opinion, the child
is not credible. Jurors should determine the credibility of all witnesses, not just the credibility of
purported expert witnesses called upon to opine about the credibility of other witnesses. This
Court should reject the State's suggestion that this Court adopt a rule that would effectively
overrule Almaraz and Perry.

F.

The State Has Failed To Assert, Much Less Demonstrate, That The Error In Admitting
Agent Martin's Testimony Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State has failed to meet either its burden of production or persuasion demonstrating

beyond a reasonable doubt, that Agent Martin's testimony did not contribute to the guilty verdict.
1.

The State Is Required To Prove, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Agent
Martin's Testimonv Did Not Contribute To The Guilty Verdict, Not That A Guilty
Verdict Would Have Been Rendered Had The Jury Not Heard Agent Martin's
Testimonv

Initially, the State claims, '"The inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational
Jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged
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evidence.

(Respondent's Brief, p.10 (quoting State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669 (2010)) (in

tum citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. l, 18
(1999)).) The suggestion is that this Court should consider whether the jury would have found
Mr. Ehrlick guilty had they not heard Agent Martin's testimony. While the State quotes the

Johnson opinion accurately, the legal premise quoted is simply wrong.
This Court has recognized,
Under the Chapman harmless error analysis, where a constitutional violation
occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection, a reversal is
necessitated, unless the State proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."

(Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584 _ , 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
I (2010) (in turn quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).) Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court has held,
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That
must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact
rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might
be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee.

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993) (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578
(1986); Clark, 478 U.S at 593 (BLACKMON, J., dissenting); Pope v. lllinois, 481 U.S. 497,
509-510 (1987) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).) Notably, in reversing the defendant's conviction,
the Almaraz Court noted, "the State never specifically argues that [improperly admitted
testimony] did not 'contribute to the verdict obtained' as clearly required under Perry." Almaraz
154 Idaho at_, 301 P.3d 242, 256. Thus, it is not enough for the State to assert the jury would
have convicted Mr. Ehrlick if the district court correctly kept Agent Martin's opinion testimony
on eyewitness identifications out.

The State must first assert, and then prove beyond a
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reasonable doubt, that Agent Martin's testimony did not contribute to the guilty verdict actually
attained.
2.

The State Has Failed To Assert A Claim That Agent Martin's Opinion That M.R.
And Jennifer Hastings Were Not Credible Was Harmless; Therefore, This Court
Must Vacate Mr. Ehrlick's Convictions

The State erroneously claims that Agent Martin provided her inadmissible opinion
testimony only as it related to O.J.'s credibility. (Respondent's Brief, p.11.) Agent Maiiin's
opinion testimony was not so limited.
Agent Martin testified that her role was to create a "research timeline" to determine the
last time R.M. was seen, and she did so by conducting her own interviews and reviewing "all the
reports" to try and find the last "credible sighting." (Tr., p.4434, L.4 - p.4440, L.24.) Agent
Martin testified that she investigated reports of other people who said they saw R.M. in the pool
area on the 24 th and, again over defense counsel's objection that her opinion invades the province
of the jury, and that "The jury is the sole judge of credibility here, not this witness," the district
court allowed Agent Martin to testify that she did not find any sightings that she believed to be
credible. (Tr., p.4457, L.8 - p.4458, L.14.) Agent Martin testified that, "There were several
reports that [R.M.] had been at the pool and in the hot tub that day with other children," and
over defense counsel's "asked and answered" objection, Agent Martin testified that she was not
able to find a last credible sighting of R.M. (Tr., p.4459, L. 15 - p.4460, L.16 (emphasis
added).)
In addition to O.J., M.R. who was 17 at the time R.M. went missing, testified that she
was visiting her friend C.G., and the two of them took C.G.'s younger siblings to the pool around
6:30 p.m. (Tr., p.5679, L.21 - p.5686, L.18.) M.R. testified that she saw R.M., whom she had
seen before at the complex and knew by name, near the pool area playing with C.G.'s youngest
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siblings and K.D. later in the evening (Tr., p.5686, L.19

p.5692, L.8.) M.R. testified that she

has been interviewed by Agent Martin and others several times, and that she told Agent Maiiin
the same information that she testified to and that she is positive she saw R.M. (Tr., p.5693, Ls.9.) Additionally, Jennifer Hastings, another neighbor who had taken her kids down to the pool
on July 24 th , testified that she was shown a picture of R.M. on the night of the 24 th by an officer
and that she told the officer that she had, in fact, seen R.M. in the pool area. (Tr., p.5739, L.7 p.5751, L.1.)
The State's claim that Agent Martin only opined as to O.J.'s credibility is simply false.
She testified that her very purpose in the investigation was to review all of the reports and she
did so. She testified, over defense objection, that she found no credible sightings. M.R. and
Jennifer Hastings each testified that they saw R.M. alive and well in the pool area on July 24 th
and gave this information to police - M.R. testified that she specifically spoke with Agent
Martin.

The State has affirmatively forfeited its opportunity to argue that Agent Martin's

opinion regarding the credibility M.R. and Ms. Hastings' testimony, believing that Agent Martin
did not do so. (Respondent's Brief, p.11, fn. l. )3 As such, if this Court finds error, this Court
must vacate Mr. Ehrlick's convictions. (See Almaraz, 154 Idaho at_, 301 P.3d at 256-257.)
3.

The State Failed To Argue, Much Less Demonstrate Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt That Agent Martin's Testimony That She Found O.J. Not To Be Credible
Did Not Contribute To The Verdict Obtained

Based upon its claim that the evidence against Mr. Ehrlick was "very strong," the State
argues, "this court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt both that the jury would have
concluded there were no credible sightings of R.M. alive the afternoon he died and would have

3

To the extent that the State is asserting that an expert may opine as to the credibility of witness so long as the
expert does not mention that person by name, the State does so with neither argument nor authority. (See
Respondent's Brief, p.11, fu. l) Furthermore, if a party can get around Almaraz and Perry by having an expert
testify that the a witness is not credible, but not name the particular witness, a party's ability to present a witness that
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found Ehrlick guilty had the challenged testimony by Agent Martin not been admitted."
(Respondent's Brief, p.12.) The State's entire harmless error argument is based upon a nonexistent standard of review. The State has failed to acknowledge, let alone address, the question
of whether Agent Martin's testimony contributed the verdict.
The State argues, "[n]or was Agent Martin's testimony that she concluded the last
sighting reported by O.J. was not credible and therefore abandoned as a lead ultimately unfairly
prejudicial to [Mr.] Ehrlick because the jury had ample opportunity to review O.J. 's many
inconsistent statements and make its own credibility determinations." (Respondent's Brief, p.11
(emphasis added).) Again, this is simply not the correct test. The State must prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the error did not contribute to the verdict, not that the evidence was "unfairly"
prejudicial. See Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584 __, 301 P.3d 242, 256-257 (2013). Furthermore, the
State has tacitly acknowledged that the evidence was prejudicial (though in its opinion not
"unfairly" so) and, thus, has tacitly acknowledged that it cannot meet its actual burden of
demonstrating the evidence did not contribute to the verdict
Furthermore, the State argues, "[t]here is no reason to believe in this case that the jury
simply defened to the agent rather than made its own credibility determination." Id Again, this
is simply not the correct test. The jury need not completely "defer" to Agent Martin's credibility
determination in order for the testimony to be harmful (and, thus, not harmless). Jurors need
only consider this testimony in weighing their own credibility determination. If jurors, when
considering whether or not O.J. saw R.M. alive and well on July 241\ considered Agent Martin's
opinion, by definition, Agent Martin's testimony contributed to their own credibility
determination and, under the facts of this case, contributed to the verdict.

As argued in the

would invade the province of the jury, will be entirely dependent upon the attorney's ability to refrain from asking
the expert the name of the witness they are opining about.
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Appellant's Brief (see Appellant's Brief, pp.17-21), and not challenged in the Respondent's
Brief (see Respondent's Briet: pp.I 0-13 ), Agent Martin's credibility determination did not go to
collateral subject - it went to the heart of both the prosecution and defense cases. The State
must prove that Agent Martin's testimony did not contribute to the verdict - they do not meet
this burden by suggesting, without any supporting evidence, that the jury may not have deferred
to her opinion.
Finally, the State's argument that evidence showed R.M. ate oatmeal less than 5 hours
before his death (and thus, Mr. Ehrlick must have killed him)4 (Respondent's Brief, p.12), in
addition to being totally irrelevant to the proper harmless error analysis, is another tacit
acknowledgement that the error in this case is not harmless. The State's argument is founded
upon the unremarkable idea that jurors often times believe expert testimony. The State supports
its claim by citing to transcripts bearing the testimony of Dr. Cass Smith, a pediatric
gastroenterologist, and Dr. Michael Sexton, a child-abuse pediatrician, who both opined as to
how long it would take a child such as R.M. to digest oatmeal and raisins. (Respondent's Brief,
p.12; see also Tr., p.1912, L.7 - p.2015, L.3.) The State's argument necessarily depends upon
the premise that jurors would necessarily accept this testimony as fact.

However, the State

provides no explanation as to why jurors in this case would believe the expert opinions of
Drs. Smith and Sexton, but would not even consider Agent Martin's expert opinion when making
their own credibility determinations. There is simply no reason to believe, and the State has not
offered a reason to consider, that the testimony of Drs. Smith and Sexton contributed to the
verdict, but Agent Smith's testimony did not.

4

The State never actually established a time of death. See generally, Tr.
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The State has failed to adequately raise, properly analyze, and sufficiently prove, that the
district court's erroneous decision to allow Agent Martin to opine on the credibility of
eyewitnesses is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

IL
The District Court Erred In Admitting State's Exhibit 26-A, A Model OfR.M.'s Head, As The
Exhibit Was Not Relevant, Could Not Assist The Jury, And Was Overly Prejudicial
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that it was error for the district court to allow the admittance of a

model of R.M.'s head because the model was inaccurate and, as such, could not assist the jury
either by illustrating the size of the contusion in comparison to R.M.' s head or in comparing
R.M.'s head to a hole in the wall, the purposes for which it was admitted. Mr. Ehrlick also
asserts that, without expert testimony to assist the jury in a comparison between the model and
the hole in the wall, the jury was not able to appropriately compare the two, rendering the exhibit
inadmissible for the purpose of making such a comparison. In response, the State asserts that the
model is "relevant to show the location and relative size of R.M. 's injuries and that [Mr.] Ehrlick
could have inflicted those injuries by striking R.M.'s head against a wall in [Mr.] Ehrlick's
apartment with sufficient force to cause a hole generally matching the size of R.M.'s head."
(Respondent's Brief, p.13.) Reply is necessary to address these erroneous assertions.
B.

The District Court Erred In Admitting State's Exhibit 26-A, A Model Of R.M.'s Head,
As The Exhibit Was Not Relevant, Could Not Assist The Jury, And Was Overly
Prejudicial

1.

The Model Head Was Not Relevant: Therefore, It Was Not Admissible

The State has asserted that the model was relevant and that Mr. Ehrlick's appellate
argument goes only to weight, citing to several cases in support of its claim. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.14-16.) However, Mr. Ehrlick maintains that the model is not relevant as it did not
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have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence." LR.E. 401.
The cases relied upon by the State to show that exhibits that are similar or not to scale can
be admissible are not persuasive in the matter at hand. In State v. Durst, 126 Idaho 140 (1994 ),
an anatomically correct doll was used to assist a mentally disabled woman in explaining to the
jury what the defendant had done to her, "the dolls helped her explain those events and thus their
use assisted the jury in understanding the victim's testimony." Id. at 142. In Durst accuracy of
the exhibit was not at issue.

Id.

The exhibit was only used by the victim to explain her

testimony, not admitted for the jury to make its own comparisons and it does not appear that the
exhibit was admitted and provided to the jury. Id As such, this case offers little guidance on
whether the model ofR.M.'s head was relevant in the case at hand, where accuracy is challenged
and the model was admitted for the purposes of indentifying the size of an injury to the victim
and comparing its size to another exhibit.
The State has also relied upon State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139 (2008). In Stevens, a video
depicting four different objects falling down stairs was found to be relevant for the purpose of
illustrating testimony regarding the principals involved in such a fall. Id. at 143-144. The jury
was instructed that the video was "simply evidence used to illustrate Shaibani's testimony." 5 Id.
at 143. In this case, the four items shown falling from the stairs did not simulate a human body.
Id Because Stevens did not involve a model offered to closely resemble the victim or a human

in any way, and did not involve the direct action of the jury in comparing pieces of evidence, this
case is also distinguishable and offers little, if any, applicable authority.

5 Mr. Ehrlick notes that the limiting instruction given immediately after the introduction of the evidence was a
critical point in the analysis of the prejudicial effect of the evidence. Id. at 144. There was no such limiting
instruction provided in the case at hand.
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Further, Mr. Ehrlick notes that in Stevens the jury was afforded expert testimony on
whether or not a fall could have induced the victim's injuries, including specific expert testimony
on the "principals involved" in how objects fall down stairs. Id at 144. However, in the case at
hand, no expert testimony was provided for the jury to assist in their comparison of the model
and the hole in the wall. As such, this case supports Mr. Ehrlick's proposition that evidence like
the model requires expert testimony to supply its relevance and assist the jury in understanding
and adequately interpreting the evidence.

Certainly if expert testimony is required to explain

how objects fall down stairs, expert testimony is required to explain one object's impact upon
another and the resulting damage.
In State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77 (Ct.App 2008), the defendant asserted that the State had
failed to adequately connect a screen name (used in enticing a child) to Mr. Glass. Id. at 82. The
Idaho Court of Appeals found that there had been sufficient evidence to tie the screen name and,
as such, the chat logs, to Mr. Glass and meet foundational requirements. Id.

The Court went on

to hold that the strength of the connection between Mr. Glass and the chat logs was to be
considered by the jury in deciding whether or not Mr. Glass was the perpetrator, i.e. claims that
evidence is insufficient to show the matter for which it is offered go to weight, not relevance. Id
This holding is not applicable to the case at hand.
The dispute in the case at hand is to the accuracy of the model and its ability to assist the
Jury. In Mr. Ehrlick's case, the model cannot assist the jury for its admitted purposes if it is not
accurate. The jury in Glass was able to determine if the chat logs contained communications
from Mr. Glass after being provided expert testimony on the uniqueness of chat names. Id. at 81.

Glass's holding could be persuasive if the model in Mr. Ehrlick's case was accurate and the jury
was provided some expert testimony to assist them in making a determination as to what weight
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to

a companson between the model and the wall.

However, because the model was

inaccurate and the jury was not provided expert guidance, the jury was deprived its ability to
adequately weigh the evidence and, therefore, Glass is not persuasive.

State v. Christopherson, 108 Idaho 502 (Ct.App 1985), was cited by the State in support
of its arggument that "[ c]laims that the evidence is not sufficient to show the matter for which it
offered go to weight, not relevance" because the admission of knives of "similar description" to
the knife used in the robbery 'was proper." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) However, the entire
discussion of this issue in Christopherson is as quoted as follows, "Finally, since the robber used
a folding knife with a four-inch blade, the admission of defendant's knives of a similar

description was proper. Even though subsequent cross-examination revealed that the knives were
not the ones used, any possible prejudicial effoct was effectively negated by the crossexamination." Christopherson, 108 at 505. l\fr. Ehrlick asserts that this limited analysis, which
primarily h)cused on the prejudicial effect, is not in anyway persuasive on the issue at hand.
The State then relied upon State v. Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74 (2001) and State v. Shaw, 839

S. W.2d 30 (I 992), for the proposition that models of victims· heads are admissible unless the
jury would be misled. In Rhodes, the model, vvhich was "life-sized, realistic, bruise covered and
generally grotesque,'' was used to show the locations of injuries and whether they could have
been caused from intentional violence (location and distance of bruises was inconsistent with the
defense theory) and was admitted "solely for illustrative purposes so Dr. I'vkGee could explain
the iruuries from a three-dimensional perspective, and cautioned the jury about the model's
limited function." Rhodes, 627 N. W.2d at 84. In Shaw, the model was a Styrofoam model of a
head with a pencil inserted to show the location of the wound and angle taken by the bullet.

Shaw, 839 S.W.2d at 35. The court specifically found that the jury could not have been mislead
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by the evidence and that, to the contrary, the model aided the jury in understanding the expert's
testimony about the path of the bullet. Id. :Mr. Ehrlick asserts that these cases appear to be more
on point with the use of the model by Dr. Groben for the purposes of illustrating where the
contusion was located on the skull, an issue that was not raised by Mr. Ehrlick on appeal.
Fmiher, he asserts that these cases support his position that the model was not admissible for
other purposes because, unlike the models in Rhodes and Shaw, the model of R.M.'s head could
easily mislead the jury due to its inaccuracy.
The State maintains that the model head is relevant to show the "relative size'' of R.M.'s
head and in determining the mechanism of injury (does the model match

hole in the wall).

(Respondent's Brief, p.15.) However, the mlKlel cannot show either of these things because of its
inaccuracy. Despite the State's attempt to characterize the exhibit's erroneous measurements as
"minor differences," and to misrepresent and underestimate the true extent of the discrepancies

by stating that such an exhibit does not need to be ··precise to the millimeter," the model head is
decidedly inaccurate: 3.5 centimeters in the circumference and .7 centimeters in breadth. (Tr.,
p.2802, L.25 - p.2804, L.5.) The State also asserts that model was "accurate enough'' to allow
for certain comparisons. (Respondent's Brief, p.16.) Mr. Ehrlick maintains that this is simply
not true especially in light of the State's argument that the model ''matches up perfectly with the
model of the hole in the wall," but is notably smaller that R.M.'s actual head. (Tr., p.1470, L.15,
p.2931, Ls.10-11.)
The State has also asserted that this

should not consider a hat sizing chart or infant

head circumference chart mentioned in the Appellant's Brief (Respondent's Brief: p 16, n.2.)
Mr. Ehrlick certainly agrees that these documents were not provided or argued to the district
com1. However, they need not be because they are only discussed to help highlight the extreme
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inaccuracy of the model. The actual measurements which were applied to these charts were
the district court Certainly no evidence \Vas presented regarding measurements taken by
a haberdasher or a pediatrician and the modd 'vvas not presented to show hat

or percentile for

head growth. These charts were used only to illustrate an example, not to definitively prove hat
and to place the disparity in head

into proper perspective, much in the same way

hypotheticals are routinely used to illustrate a point. 6

Further, the State has provided no

authority in support of its proposition that they cannot be considered for this purpose.
2.

Absent Expert Testimony, The Model Was Inadmissible As It Could Not Assist
The Jury

The State appears to be arguing through its citation to State v. Simmons, 102 Idaho 672
(Ct.App. 1991) (addressing the admissibility of silver dollars which could not be positively
identified) that Mr. Ehrlick has not proven that expert testimony was necessary to prove that the
model head was a model of R.M. 's head. This is not the issue addressed on appeal. Instead, the
issue is whether or not the jury should or could use the model head to evaluate how it fit into the
wall without expert testimony on this issue. Mr. Ehrlick maintains that the model could not
assist the jury in making this determination without the additional assistance of an expert and
directs the Court attention to the argument presented on pages 29-31 of the Appellant's Brief.
The State has failed to argue otherwise.

3.

The Probative Value Is Outweighed By The Prejudicial Effect

The State's arguments on this issue are unremarkable and will not be addressed in this
Brief.

6 Mr. Ehrlick is aware that 3.5 centimeters and .7 centimeters may sound like minor discrepancies. However, they
are substantial in this circumstance and these documents illustrate the significance; these measurements reflect a
difference in head size from an infant/toddler under three years of age and an eight-year-old boy.
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4.

The State Failed To Assert, Much Less Demonstrate, That The Error In Admitting
The Model OfR.M's Head Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

The State applied the improper harmless error standard, failing to present argument that
the erroneously admitted model of R.M.'s did not contribute to the conviction. The State must
show "beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence
complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,227 (2010); State v.

Sharp, 101 Idaho 498,507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). The
State has merely argued that the there is "no reason to believe that the jury disregarded the
evidence [regarding the accuracy of the model]." (Respondent's Brief: p. l 9.) The State has
failed to argue, much less prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury did not consider the
model head for its asserted purposes and that such considerations did not contribute to the
convictions. Therefore, the State has failed to meet its burden to show the error is harmless.

IIL
The District Court Erred By Admitting Highlv Prejudicial Rule 404(b) Evidence That Was Not
Relevant To Any Issue Other Than Propensity
A.

Introduction
Reply is necessary to address the State's assertion that the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence

regarding the abuse of three of Mr. Ehrlick's former girlfriends is relevant to show intent.
Mr. Ehrlick will also discuss the State's erroneous argument regarding harmless error.

The

State's arguments regarding weighing of the probative value versus the prejudicial effect were
unremarkable and, therefore, will not be addressed in this Reply.
B.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Highly Prejudicial Rule 404(b) Evidence That
Was Not Relevant To Any Issue Other Than Propensity
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State asserts on appeal that the 404(b) evidence related to prior acts of violence was
properly admitted for the purposes of showing intent, motive, and lack of mistake or accident.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.21-24.) However, the State has only provided argument related to the
purpose of intent. (Respondent's Brief, pp.21-24.) Because the State failed to present argument
or authority in support of its position that the evidence was relevant for the purposes of showing
motive and lack of mistake or accident, these arguments are not properly presented on appeal.

State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259,263 (1996).
l.

The Evidence Was Not Relevant To Show Intent

The State appears to argue that the evidence involving the prior abuse of three exgirlfriends is relevant and admissible either because Mr. Ehrlick admitted to physically
disciplining R.M. or because the State has a duty to prove specific intent to tmiure. Neither of
these asserted grounds allow the admission of this testimony for the purposes of showing intent,
based upon the application of relevant case law.
As discussed in detail in the Appellant's Brief, the case law relied upon by the district
court in allowing the admission of the prior bad acts evidence is easily distinguishable from the
facts of the present case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.38-42.) Most notably, in State v. Stuart, 110
Idaho 163 (1986), State v. Rodriguez, 2005 WL 1785796 (Cal. App. 1 Dist), and State v. Pierce,
346 N.C. 471 (1997) the defendants had each admitted to committing the charged acts, but
without either criminal intent or without an intent to torture.

Id.

As such, a reasonable

interpretation of these cases is that such 404(b) evidence is only admissible when the defendant
admits the charged criminal acts, but directly challenges his intent. Id. The State has provided
no authority to rebut this reading of the relevant case law.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.19-24.)

While Mr. Ehrlick did admit some limited physical disciplining of R.M., he did not admit to
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committing the crimes charged, inflicting injuries similar to the fatal injuries, or inflicting the
fatal injuries to R.M. As such, the case at hand is easily distinguishable from the relevant case
law which would allow similar 404(b) evidence and the evidence is not admissible to prove
intent under this theory.
The State has also asserted the evidence is admissible to prove intent because the State is
required to show the specific intent for torture murder, regardless of whether or not a defendant
actively challenges intent; i.e. doing more than simply asserting their innocence of the charged
acts.

(Respondent's Brief, p.24.) Mr. Ehrlick certainly agrees that the State does have the

burden to prove the specific intent for the crime charged. However, he maintains that the State is
not able to sidestep the Idaho Rules of Evidence by charging a specific intent crime. Stuart did
not hold that I.R.E. 404(b) evidence offered to show the requisite tortuous intent is always
relevant to show a sadistic nature in a torture murder case, but that such evidence was admissible
when the defendant specifically challenged his intent when committing the charged acts. Stuart,
110 Idaho at 170-171.

I.R.E. 404(b) evidence does not have a different admissibility standard in

a torture murder case than it would have for other crimes, and no such exception exists in the

rule. I.R.E. 404(b). Allowing for the admission of prior bad act evidence in the case at hand
would have the effect of making a special 404(b) admissibility rule for first degree torture
murder cases. This new "special rule" amounts to the same kind of disparate treatment that this
Court condemned in State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (holding there is no general
exception to I.R.E. 404(b) for distinct types of crimes: I.R.E. 404(b) applies in the same way for
cases involving sexual crimes as it does for all other crimes). Mr. Ehrlick fully addressed this
issue in his Appellant's Brief and refers this Court to pages 43-45 for additional support of his
assertion. The State has failed to supply any legal authority supporting a contrary reading of
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404(b) or the relevant and relied upon case law. As such, the State failed to prove that the
prior acts of violence evidence is admissible under either of its intent exception theories.
The State Failed To Assert, Much Less Demonstrate, That The Error In Admitting The
I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State has asserted that because the jury was provided with an instruction limiting the
purposes for which the I.RE. 404(b) evidence was admitted, "there is no reason to believe that
the jury did not follow the instructions under the facts of this case." (Respondent's Brief, pp.26The State continues that because Mr. Ehrlick did not prove the jury disregarded the
instructions that "the error must be deemed harmless." (Respondent's Brief, pp.26-27.) This
argument is entirely misplaced and does not accurately reflect the standards for harmless error.
The State's argument is dependent on their being no error to find harmless, that it was not
error for the jury to have heard the I.RE. 404(b) evidence regardless of a limiting instruction
clarifying the purpose for which the jury could consider the evidence.

(Respondent's Brief,

pp.26-27.) In order to show an error was harmless, there must be a starting point, for the sake of
argument, that there was an error.

A jury instruction limiting the way a jury considers the

evidence cannot cure the error of allowing them to hear the improper evidence unless the
instruction is to completely disregard the evidence in its entirety. No such instruction was given
to the jury in this case. The State's argument appears to be a concession that this evidence was
limitedly and properly considered by the jury in rendering its verdict. The State has failed to
show "beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence
complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010); State v.

Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
Therefore, because the State has conceded that the jury considered the information and made no
attempt to prove that the information did not contribute to the verdict, the State has failed to meet
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its burden to show the error is harmless and this Court must vacate Mr. Ehrlick's convictions.
lV.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Granted The State's Second Motion In Limine
Regarding The Presentation Of Evidence Of Mr. Ehrlick's Alleged Attempt To Alter And/Or
Influence Testimony Of Ms. Jenkins
Introduction
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that evidence of his attempts to communicate with Ms. Jenkins did
not prove that he was attempting to alter or influence Mr. Jenkins' testimony and, as a result, was
not relevant evidence. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.50-54.) In response, the State asserts that the
evidence could demonstrate either that Mr. Ehrlick was innocent or that he was attempting to
alter Ms. Jenkins' testimony and that such evidence is relevant because it could potentially infer
guilt. (Respondent's Brief, pp.27-32.) Reply is necessary to address this assertion, the State's
failure to argue about the prejudicial effect of such evidence under I.R.E. 403, and the State's
failure to meet its burden of proof in regards to harmless error.
B.

The Evidence Was Not Admissible As It Was Not Relevant
In the Respondent's Brief, the State has conceded that the evidence regarding

Mr. Ehrlick's alleged attempt to alter or influence Ms. Jenkins' testimony has an interpretation
other than the State's theory: either the prevention of the admission of "incriminating truthful
evidence" or "to prevent Jenkins from providing false testimony tending to incriminate him."
(Respondent's Brief, p.30.) The State then asserts that the evidence is relevant as a matter of law
because it "could be interpreted (having any tendency)" to show the State's theory of the
evidence.

(Respondent's Brief, p.30 (emphasis original).)

It appears from the State's

emphasized language that it acknowledges that this is not a case were the relevance of the
disputed evidence is overtly clear, but an instance were one must at a minimum read much more
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into Mr. Ehrlick's statements to find an interpretation that "could" show "any" tendency to
support the State's interpretation. Mr. Ehrlick's arguments supporting a plain reading of his
statements and the hurdles the State must leap in order to arrive at their interpretation were fully
addressed in the Appellant's Brief and are incorporated herein by reference. (See Appellant's
Brief, pp.50-54.)
While Mr. Ehrlick acknowledges that the State has correctly defined I.RE. 401, he
asse1is that the State's interpretation infringes upon the purpose of the rule by stretching the
limits of what constitutes, or in this case ''could" constitute, relevant evidence, and fails to
address Mr. Ehrlick's arguments that his interpretation of relevant case law supports a finding
that the evidence was inadmissible. As such, Mr. Ehrlick maintains that through application of
both I.R.E. and applicable case law, this court should find that the evidence was not relevant and
not admissible.
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401, the
State's argument disregards I.R.E. 402 which states that "[a]II relevant evidence is admissible
except as otherwise provided by these rules ... " I.R.E. 402. Specifically, because the evidence
has, as conceded by the State, more than one potential interpretation there is danger of jury
confusion and unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403.
C.

The Probative Value Is Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice
The State has asserted that "[t]he danger of unfair prejudice within the scope of I.R.E.

404(b) is the tendency of the evidence to 'prove the character of a person in order to show that
the person acted in conformity therewith."'

(Respondent's Brief, p.31 (quoting from I.R.E.

404(b)).) The State has supplied no authority for its assertion regarding the limits of a prejudice
analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) and, as such, this argument is not properly presented on appeal.
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State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). The State has misconstrued I.R.E. 404(b). I.R.E.
404(b) specifically states that evidence is not admissible for purposes of proving the character of
a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. I.RE. 404(b). As such,
if evidence is offered for another proper purpose, a defendant would never be able to address

"unfair prejudice within the scope of I.R.E. 404(b )" under the State's theory.
The correct analysis for determining the admissibility of I.RE. 404(b) evidence is a twostep analysis: (1) whether, under I.R.E. 404(b ), the evidence is relevant as a matter of law to an
issue other than the defendant's character or criminal propensity; and (2) whether, under I.R.E.
403, the district court abused its discretion in finding the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. State v.

Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010). Therefore, it is I.RE. 403 that controls the balancing of
probative value verses unfair prejudice.
The State has failed to address prejudice under I.RE. 403 as argued by Mr. Ehrlick. 7 As
such, Mr. Ehrlick requests that this Court only consider his uncontested arguments regarding
prejudice as presented in the Appellant's Brief.
D.

The State Failed To Assert, Much Less Demonstrate, That The Error In Admitting The
Evidence Related To Mr. Ehrlick's So Called Attempt To Alter Or Influence Ms.
Jenkins' Testimony Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

The State has attempted a cursory argument regarding harmless error in a footnote.
(Respondent's Brief, p.32, n.4.) However, the State has only argued the evidence presented

7 The State has argued that "Ehrlick identified no act in conformity with character that the disputed evidence tends to
prove" and that "[t]o the extent that evidence Ehrlick has an 'unlikeable' 'personality and style' can be characterized
as proving Ehrlick's character 'in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith,' Ehrlick has failed to
show an abuse of discretion." (Respondent's Brief, p.31.) Although it is difficult to discern the State's exact
argument regarding the improper prejudice standard, to the extent that the State is arguing that this evidence is
character evidence, as opposed to permissible evidence regarding consciousness of guilt, Mr. Ehr lick asserts that this
Court should find the evidence was improperly admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b ).
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regarding Mr. Ehrlick's alleged attempts to alter or influence Ms. Jenkins' testimony "did not
unfairly influence the jury's verdict." (Respondent's Brief, p.32, n.4.) The correct standard for
harmless error is: "To hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of
contributed to the conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (emphasis added)). As such, the State must meet the higher
burden of showing the evidence could not have contributed to the conviction, not that it was
considered, but did not unfairly influence the jury's verdict. Therefore, the State has failed to
meet its burden to show the error is harmless. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,227 (2010).
V.

The District Comi Erred In Granting The State's Motion In Limine Regarding The Presentation
Of Evidence Of Mr. Ehrlick's Emergency Room Visit On July 31, 2009

A

Introduction
Mr. Ehrlick maintains that there is no evidence to support that he attempted suicide or

feigned a suicide attempt, rendering this evidence irrelevant and inadmissible. (See Appellant's
Brief, pp.56-63.) The State asserts that there are conflicting interpretations of the evidence
related to an alleged suicide attempt or feigned suicide attempt and as such, the evidence is
relevant. (Respondent's Brief, pp.34-36.) The State's argument is without merit, and the State
has once again failed to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

The Evidence Related To Mr. Ehrlick's Emergency Room Visit Was Erroneously
Admitted
The State has asserted that "[Mr.] Ehrlick's argument amounts to no more than a claim

there are conflicting interpretations of the evidence." (Respondent's Brief, pp.35-36.) However,
Mr. Ehrlick has asserted that there is no evidence that he attempted suicide as found by the
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district court. 8 The State has failed to present any evidence that Mr. Ehrlick took or attempted to
take a lethal dose of Lorazepam pills.

(Respondent's Brief: p.34.)

Instead the evidence,

including testimony provided medical professionals presented at trial, show there was no suicide
attempt. (S.R., p.417, 676-678; Tr., p.468, Ls.17-24, p.5472, L.21 -p.5474, L.3.) Additionally,
the State explicitly took the position that there was no suicide attempt in its arguments to the
district court. (S.R., p.417.) As such, the State is now arguing an inconsistent position by
attempting to assert for the first time on appeal that Mr. Ehrlick actually attempted suicide.
The State has also asserted that "the evidence supports the inference that [Mr.] Ehrlick
had ... feigned attempt to take his life ... " (Respondent's Brief: p.35.) Mr. Ehrlick again
maintains that there are not conflicting interpretations of this evidence, that there is no evidence
of a fake suicide attempt, and that it is ludicrous to believe that an individual was actively faking
a suicide attempt while at the same time repeatedly stating to all who asked that he was not
attempting suicide. (S.R., pp.676-678.)
Due to there being no evidence that supports a finding of an actual or feigned suicide
attempt, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the State's arguments regarding "conflicting interpretations of
the evidence" are not applicable. The State's theory requires this Court to disregard what the
actual evidence showed in order to surmise a false conflict in the interpretation of the evidence,
and then to liberally apply I.R.E. 401 to uphold the improper finding that Mr. Ehrlick had
attempted suicide.
Because the State's arguments concerning the prejudicial effect of this evidence and the
violation of Mr. Ehrlick's Fifth Amendment rights were not remarkable, no further reply is

8 It is important to note that he district court found only that there was evidence of an actual suicide attempt and its
considerations for allowing the presentation of the testimony were based solely on this finding.
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necessary.

Accordingly, Mr. Ehrlick simply refers the Court back to pages 63-66 of his

Appellant's Brief.
The State Failed To Assert, Much Less Demonstrate, That The Error In Admitting LR.E.
Evidence Of Mr. Ehrlick's Emergency Room Visit Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt
In another footnote (Respondent's Brief, p.38, fo.6), the State again applies a nonexistent harmless error standard. The State made no argument that the evidence could not have
contributed to the conviction (See State v. Peny, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010)), but merely stated
that the jury could not have concluded that the evidence showed a substance abuse problem or an
invocation to the right to silence indicating guilt. (Respondent's Brief, p.38, n.6.) As such, the
State failed to meet its burden to prove the error was harmless and this Court must vacate
Mr. Ehrlick's convictions.

VL
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing Samantha Burnett To Testify That Others
Told Her That They Had Not Heard Of A Birthday Party And That, In Her Lay Opinion, The
Story OfR.M. Going To A Birthday Party Did Not Make Sense To Her

A.

Introduction
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Samantha

Burnett to testify that others had told her of a birthday party, and further erred in allowing her to
testify that, based in part on upon this information, the story of R.M. going to a birthday party
did not make sense to her. His arguments in support of this claim are found in the Appellant's
Brief, and need not be repeated herein in detail but are incorporated by reference.
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(See

Appellant's Brief, pp.67-72.) This Reply is necessary to address the State's factually erroneous
claims and meritless legal arguments. 9

R

Mr. Ehrlick Did Not Claim There Was A Birthday Party, Only That R.M. Asked To
Attend One
The State asserts that Mr. Ehrlick "originally claimed that R.M. had gone to a birthday

party that he failed to return from." (Respondent's Brief, p.38 (citing Tr., p.3156, L.16
L. 10; p.3331, L. 10

p.3162,

p.3343, L.22).) This is false. Mr. Ehrlick consistently claimed that R.M.

asked him if he could attend a birthday party, that he told R.M. he could not, that R.M. went
back outside to play, and that Mr. Ehrlick went to look for R.M. and the birthday party R.M.
asked him to attend when R.M. did not come home; however, Mr. Ehrlick never claimed that
there was an actual birthday party. (See generally, Ex., pp.68-69 (transcript of Mr. Ehrlick's call
to 911); Ex., pp.73-110 (Officer Schloegel's audio recorded July 24, 2009 at the complex); Ex.,
pp.131-168 (Mr. Ehrlick's interview with detectives on July 25, 2009); Ex., pp.170-224
(Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins' interview with law enforcement on July 26, 2009); Ex. pp.238467 (Mr. Ehrlick's interviews with law enforcement on July 30, 2009); Ex., pp.474-529
(Mr. Ehrlick's interview with law enforcement on August 9, 2009); Tr., p.5882, L.22 - p.6145,
L. 1 (Mr. Ehrlick's testimony).)

In its Respondent's Briel~ the State falsely claims that

Mr. "Ehrlick originally claimed that R.M. had gone to a bi1ihday party that he failed to return
from."

(Respondent's Brief, p.38 (citing Tr., p.3156, L.16 - p.3162, L.10; p.3331, L.10 -

p.3343, L.22.)

A review of the transcripts cited to by the State in supp01t of its claim

demonstrates that the State's factual assertion is erroneous.

9 The State's claim that Ms. Burnett's testimony was not hearsay (Respondent's Brief, pp.39-40) is unremarkable,
and Mr. Ehrlick relies upon the arguments previous made as to why her testimony was impermissibly admitted
(Appellant's Brief, pp.67-68.)
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The first section cited to by the State (Tr., p.3156, L.16 - p.3162, L.10), is a portion of
the testimony provided by Chris Phillips, the complex security guard. Id Mr. Phillips testified
that he saw Mr. Ehrlick walking around the complex, calling for R.M., and asking kids and
teenagers if they had heard about a birthday party and, if so, where it was. (Tr., p.3156, L.16 p.3158, L.14.) Some of the teenagers responded by stating that they had heard of a birthday
party but they were not sure where it was located. (Tr., p.3158, Ls.15-21.) Mr. Phillips testified
that Mr. Ehrlick "said something about [R.M.J wanting to go to a birthday party, but we don't
know where it's at," and that Mr. Ehrlick asked him if he had heard anything about a birthday
party. (Tr., p.3158, L.22 -p.3161, L.14.) He further testified that Mr. Ehrlick told him that one
the kids said there was a possible birthday party in Building D but he was not sure. (Tr.,
p.3161, Ls.I 0-22.) At no point did Mr. Phillips testify that Mr. Ehrlick "claimed that R.M. had
gone to a birthday party that he failed to return from." (See Respondent's Briet: p.38.)
The second section cited to by the State (Tr., p.3331, L. 10 - p.3343, L.22), is the
testimony of Katie Waggoner, the dispatcher who answered Mr. Ehrlick's 911 call.

Id.

Ms. Waggoner never testified that Mr. Ehrlick told her that R.M. went to a birthday party,
although she did testify that this call stood out to her because it involved a "young kid being at a
birthday party so late." (Tr., p.3334, Ls.10-16.) Regardless, what Ms. Waggoner thinks she
remembered is irrelevant

In the 911 call, which was made after Mr. Ehrlick spoke with

Mr. Phillips and after Mr. Phillips observed teenagers telling Mr. Ehrlick that they had heard of a
birthday party, Mr. Ehrlick actually said, "Everybody keeps

his name is [R.M.]. Everybody

keeps directing me to the - a birthday party. That's where everybody's saying that he's at but I
can't find this birthday party or nothing." (Tr., p.3156, L.16- p.3167, L.8; .Ex., p.69.) This is,
of course, completely consistent with Mr. Phillips' testimony noted above and with Mr. Ehrlick's
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repeated and consistent statement that R.M. asked him if he could attend a birthday party.
Neither Mr. Phillips, nor Ms. Waggoner, nor any other witness testified that Mr. Ehrlick ever
said that ·'R.M. had gone to a birthday party that he failed to return from." (Respondent's Brief,
p.38 (emphasis added).) The State's factual assertion to the contrary is false.
C.

The State Asserted That Ms. Burnett's Opinion Testimony Was Relevant To
Mr. Ehrlick's Credibility And Was Based, In Part, On Impermissible Hearsay
Opinion testimony offered pursuant to I.R.E. 701 can be based only upon the perception

of the witness, must be helpful to the determination of a fact in issue, and cannot be based upon
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.

I.R.E. 701.

No witness may opine on

whether or not another witness is credible. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584 (20 I 3). The State
offered that Ms. Burnett's testimony should be admitted in violation of both of these clear rules.
In response to defense counsel's objection that Ms. Burnett would be providing improper
and irrelevant opinion evidence, the State asserted that pursuant to I.R.E. 701, Ms. Burnett
should be allowed to provide her "impression of this birthday party story." (Tr., p.3500, L.13 p.3503, L.25.) The prosecutor continued,
My understanding of what she'll say is that there were questions about this story
from the beginning based on the time the birthday party was supposed to start, the
fact that nobody else in this apartment complex had heard about this
birthday party, and so I think it goes to the credibility of the story that
Mr. Ehrlick was telling from day one.
(Tr., p.3503, L.25 - p.3502, L.20 (emphasis added).) Ms. Burnett testified that she concluded
that the birthday party story did not make sense to her because "It was 10 o'clock at night. There
were no signs of a birthday party. I know with so many kids in that neighborhood, and none

of them knew anything about a birthday party." (Tr., p.3506, Ls.5-14 (emphasis added).)
In its Respondent's Brief, the State docs not claim that Ms. Burnett's opinion testimony
was not based upon hearsay; rather, the State merely gives examples of lay witnesses being

allowed to testify, pursuant to I.R.E. 701, based upon their own perceptions. See Respondent's
p.41 (citing State v. Salazar, 153 Idaho 24, 26 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Almaraz, 154
Idaho at_, 301 P.3d at 260; Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 750 fn.3 (2012). In

Salazar, an officer was allowed to testify that the defendant was the person seen in a security
video based upon the officer's familiarity with the defendant and upon the officer's own
perception of what was contained in the video. Salazar, 153 Idaho at 25-27. In Almaraz, a
detective was allowed to provide her lay opinion that a person she personally observed on a
security video was in a "shooter's crouch," where "[t]he defense failed to show that identifying
Almaraz's stance as a 'shooter's crouch' was due to specialized knowledge or was a term of art
used by the police." Almaraz, 154 Idaho at __, 301 P.3d at 260. In a footnote in Carillo, the
Idaho Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that lay testimony is not competent to
establish that a child has developmentally digressed because, "[s]o long as a lay witness does not
testify on the basis of specialized knowledge, his opinions or inferences are admissible testimony
they are rationally based on his own perceptions and helpful to the trier of fact." Carillo, 152
Idaho 750, fn.3 (citing I.R.E. 701.)

The State's citation to authority further confirms

Mr. Ehrlick's assertion that lay witness testimony must be based upon the witness' own
perceptions, and can't be based on impermissible hearsay.
Furthermore, the State asserts that Mr. Burnett's testimony was relevant "to prove that
[Mr.] Ehrlick sent police and dozens of volunteers on a meaningless and futile search for R.M. to

hide the fact R.A1. was already dead and [1'1r.] Ehrlick knew this." (Respondent's Brief, p.42
(emphasis in original).) Although, as noted above, the State cites to nothing in the record (and,
indeed, there is nothing there to cite) demonstrating that Mr. Ehrlick either claimed that R.M.
had gone to a birthday party or that Mr. Ehrlick knew there was no party when he spoke with the
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police, like the prosecutor during the trial proceedings (Tr., p.3503, L.25

p.3502, L.20), the

State has again acknowledged that Ms. Burnett's testimony was offered as a statement on
Mr. Ehrlick's credibility. The only way that the jurors could conclude that Mr. Ehrlick was
sending anyone on a "futile search" for R.M. and that he did so to hide the fact that he knew
R.M. was already dead, was if they believed her testimony that R.M. going to a birthday party
did not make sense to her. In tum, Mr. Burnett reached this conclusion, in part, because, "I know
with so many kids in the neighborhood, and none of them knew anything about a birthday party."
(Tr., p.3506, Ls.5-14.)

The State's argument that Ms. Brunett's opinion testimony was

admissible to show that Mr. Ehrlick sent police on a futile search, supports Mr. Ehrlick's
argument that her opinion was offered to challenge Mr. Ehrlick's credibility, and was
inadmissible.
D.

The State Has Failed To Assert, Much Less Demonstrate, That The Error In Admitting
Ms. Burnett's Opinion Testimony Did Not Contribute To The Verdict
The State's entire harmless error argument on this issue is as follows:
Finally, even if the lay opinion evidence was improperly admitted any error was
necessarily harmless given the overwhelming unchallenged evidence that those
who searched for R.M. found no evidence to support [Mr.] Ehrlick's statement
R.M. had gone to a birthday party. [Mr.] Ehrlick's argument that the absence of
one person's opinion that [Mr.] Ehrlick's insistence that R.M. had gone to a
birthday party made little sense under the circumstances "devastates the State's
weak and circumstantial case" (Appellant's brief, p. 72) is, at best, hyperbolic. 10

(Respondent's Brief, pp.42-43.) The State's harmless error argument appears to be based upon
the same faulty understanding of the harmless error rule repeated throughout its brief; namely,
the State fails to grasp that it must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not
contribute to the verdict (See Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584 _ , 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013); State v.

The hyperbole, as the State refers to it, is based upon the evidence showing there were discussions about a
birthday party occurring in the evening of July 24, 2009, and the importance the State placed on disproving the
10
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Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993);
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)), not that there was "overwhelming unchallenged
evidence that those who searched for R.M. found no evidence to suppmi [Mr.] Ehrlick's
statement R.M. had gone to a birthday party" 11 (Respondent's Brief, pp.42-43). Because the
State has failed to assert, much less prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's
ruling allowing Ms. Burnett to provide her opinion that Mr. Ehrlick's birthday party did not
make sense to her, did not contribute to the verdict, this Court must vacate Mr. Ehrlick's
convictions.

VIL
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Ehrlick's Request To Question
Detective Brechweld As To Whether K.D. Told Him That There Was Talk Of A Birthday Party
On July 24 th As The Statement Was Not Offered For The Truth Of The Matter Asserted; Rather,
The Statement Was Offered To Rebut The State's Theory That Mr. Ehrlick And Ms. Jenkins
Made Up The Bi1ihday Party Story

A.

Introduction
Mr. Ehrlick has asserted that the district court abused its discretion by denying his ability

to question Detective Brechweld as to whether K.D. told him that there was talk of a birthday
party occurring on Jury 24t11, as the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted
but, rather, was offered to rebut the State's theory that Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins were the only
sources of a story involving a birthday party. (Appellant's Brief, pp.72-74.) In response, the
State asserts that K.D.'s statements about other people talking about a birthday party were, in
turn, out-of-court statements and, thus, the testimony would constitute inadmissible double
hearsay. (Respondent's Brief, pp.43-46.) The State's argument is unremarkable except to say

existence ofa birthday party, as the existence ofa birthday party supports Mr. Ehrlick's claim that he made from the
very beginning, that R.M. asked if could attend a birthday party. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.17-21, 71-72.)
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that, whether single or double hearsay, the proffered testimony was not offered for the truth of
the matter asserted and, therefore, by definition was not hearsay. This Reply is necessary to
address the State's harmless error argument which is, once again, based upon an erroneous
factual assertion, and uses the wrong legal standard.
B.

The State Has Failed To Assert, Much Less Demonstrate, That The Error In Denying
Mr. Ehrlick The Ability To Question Detective Brechwald About Getting Information
From K.D. About A Birthday Party Did Not Contribute To The Verdict
The State again premises its harmless error argument on a claim that Mr. Ehrlick initially

claimed that R.M. had gone to a birthday party. (Respondent's Brief, p.46.) Again, the State
cites to no evidence (nor could it since none exists), that Mr. Ehrlick had said that R.M. had gone
to a birthday party. (Respondent's Brief, pp.46-47.) As noted above, Mr. Ehrlick repeatedly
said that R.M. had asked him if he could go to a birthday party, Mr. Ehrlick told him that he
could not, and that after R.M. did not return to the apartment, Mr. Ehrlick began looking for him
and looking for a birthday party. (See generally, Ex., pp.68-69 (transcript of Mr. Ehrlick's call to

911 ); Ex., pp.73-110 (Officer Schloegel's audio recorded July 24, 2009 at the complex); Ex.,
pp.131-168 (Mr. Ehrlick's interview with detectives on July 25, 2009); Ex., pp.170-224
(Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins' interview with law enforcement on July 26, 2009); Ex. pp.238467 (Mr. Ehrlick's interviews with law enforcement on July 30, 2009); Ex., pp.474-529
(Mr. Ehrlick's interview with law enforcement on August 9, 2009); Tr., p.5882, L.22 - p.6145,
L. 1 (Mr. Ehrlick's testimony).)
Furthermore, the State again fails to assert, much less prove beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the district court's ruling depriving Mr. Ehrlick the ability to present Detective Brechwald's
testimony did not contribute to the verdict. The State's case was based in large part on the

11 As noted above, the State has failed to demonstrate, and there is no evidence to support a claim, that Mr. Ehrlick
actually said that "R.M. had gone to a birthday party."

37

notion that, "[t]he reality is nobody had heard about a birthday party story. Nobody knew about a
birthday party. He's lying when he says lots of people did." (Tr., p.6261, Ls.9-15.) The State
has failed to assert or demonstrate that district court depriving the jury of evidence that the police
had, in fact, heard a "birthday party story" from someone other than Mr. Ehrliek, did not
contribute to the verdict
VIII.

The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Question Mr. Ehrlick Regarding A Custody
Agreement For R.A. And In Allowing The Custody Agreement To Be Admitted As An Exhibit,
Although It Was Later Withdrawn By The District Court As Improperly Admitted

A.

Introduction
Mr. Ehrlick has asserted that it was error for the district court to allow for the admission

of a custody order and related testimony involving Ms. Jenkins' daughter, R.A. because it was
not relevant to any issue of consequence in this case. The State has asserted this information is
relevant for the jury to make a credibility determination. Reply is necessary to address this
argument, to address the prejudicial effect of this evidence, and to address the State's failure to
meet its burden to prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.

The Custody Agreement And Related Testimony Were Irrelevant And Inadmissible
The State has asserted that "[t]he existence of a custody order prohibiting leaving R.A.

alone with [Mr.] Ehrlick impeached the testimony that he was R.A.'s primary caregiver and the
inference that he provided good care for R.A." (Respondent's Brief, p.50.) While Mr. Ehrlick
concedes that evidence that impeaches a witness may be relevant to credibility determinations,
he maintains that this evidence was not properly admitted impeachment evidence because it did
not have the actual effect of impeaching Mr. Ehrlick. Simply, the custody agreement proves
only that R.A. was legally not to be left alone in the care of Mr. Ehrlick. (Tr., p. 6051, Ls.1-22.)
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Contrary to the State's assertion, the mere existence of the order does not have a tendency
to prove that Mr. Ehrlick was not providing appropriate care for R.A. in the summer of 2008.
This is similar to saying that a no contact order between a domestic violence victim and the
abuser has some tendency to show that the abuser did not contact the victim after issuance of an
order, regardless of whether or not the abuser had been informed of the order.

While the

existence of the no contact order may criminalize otherwise legal behavior, it does not prove that
either party acted in conformity with the order; nor does it have some tendency to show that the
order was complied with.

Without some proof of knowledge of the order or evidence that

Mr. Ehrlick had not been an appropriate care provider for R.A. in the summer of 2008, the mere
existence of the order has no tendency to prove that Mr. Ehrlick was providing false or unreliable
testimony.
The State has asserted that Mr. Ehrlick must have known about the order because he was
in a domestic relationship with Mr. Jenkins and because the couple had used a babysitter.
(Respondent's Brief, p.50.) However, neither of these facts demonstrate that Mr. Ehrlick was
informed of the order. It is merely speculation on the part of State that the use of a babysitter
signified that Ms. Jenkins informed Mr. Ehrlick of the custody order, and that Mr. Ehrlick was
attempting to not be alone providing appropriate care for R.A.
Additionally, the State asserts that Mr. Ehrlick not being aware of the custody order,
somehow has a tendency to prove that he was not providing appropriate care for R.A.
(Respondent's Briet~ p.51.) The State fails to show how Mr. Ehrlick not being aware of a legal
document issued in a proceeding he was not involved with, has any tendency to prove that he
was not providing appropriate care for R.A. in 2008 and, as such, the State has failed to show
how this lack of knowledge impeaches his testimony. Because the State has failed to show how
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the custody order actually provided impeachment of Mr. Ehrlick's testimony that he provided
appropriate care for R.A. in the summer of 2008, it is not relevant for the limited purpose of
impeaching Mr. Ehrlick.
C.

The Probative Value Is Outweighed By The Prejudicial Effect
The State has also asserted that there was no unfair prejudice to Mr. Ehrlick because it

would be "irrational" for the jury to reach the conclusion that R.A. would be in danger if left
alone with Mr. Ehrlick. (Respondent's Brief, p.53.) However, this was the conclusion the State
attempted to insure the jury reached by asking the question: "Isn't it true that in January of 2008,
Rusty Ames, [R.A.]'s father, filed a petition with the court saying that [R.A.J was in an unsafe
and unsatisfactory environment while Melissa was living with you?" (Tr., p.6039, Ls.7-11.) The
State then discussed the order which limited Mr. Ehrlick's ability to be alone with R.A.,
implying that such order had been issued because of an unsafe and unsatisfactory environment.
(Tr., p.6051, Ls.1-22.)

While "unsatisfactory" may not imply a threat of danger, certainly

"unsafe" does. As such, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that it is neither irrational nor unwarranted for the
jury to reach the conclusion that R.A. was in danger based upon the questioning related to the
agreement. In a case dealing with the death of a child that had been in the care of Mr. Ehrlick,
this evidence is highly prejudicial, and to the extent it has any probative value at all, it is
outweighed by the prejudicial effect.
D.

The State Failed To Assert, Much Less Demonstrate, That The Error In Admitting
Evidence Of The R.A. Custody Order Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Finally, the State failed to sufficiently meet its burden of proving the error harmless. See

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). The State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed
to the conviction.

Instead, the State argued only that it was not plausible that the jury could

40

conclude that Mr. Ehrlick was a risk to R.A. and therefore killed R.M.

(Respondent's Brief,

p.53.) The State totally failed to address the possibility of the contested evidence contributing to
the convictions.

As such, the State has again failed to meet its burden and Mr. Ehrlick's

convictions must be vacated.
IX.
The State Violated Mr. Ehrlick's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial Misconduct
Misconduct For Which There Was An Objection:
The Prosecution Committed
Misconduct By Encroaching Upon The Jury's Function To Make Credibility
Determinations When It Repeatedly Referred To Mr. Ehrlick As A Liar
The State's argued that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by calling Mr. Ehrlick
a liar because the arguments were "strictly confined" to "commentary about the statements
themselves." (Respondent's Brief, pp.58-59.) These arguments are not remarkable and will not
be addressed in this Reply Brief.

Mr. Ehrlick maintains, as discussed thoroughly in the

Appellant's Brief, that the language used by the State and its meaning is clear from the record
and that such argument is not merely permissible comment on the evidence, but rises to the level
of expressing personal opinion and blatantly describing Mr. Ehrlick as a liar.
Because this error was preserved for appellate review, the State has the burden of
"demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 227 (2010). The State has once again failed to assert, present any argument in support of,
and prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that such error did not contribute to the conviction. As
such, the State has again failed to meet its burden and, if error is found, this Court must vacate
Mr. Ehrlick's convictions.
B.

Misconduct For Which There Was No Objection:
The Prosecution Committed
Misconduct By Arguing That Certain Actions By Mr. Ehrlick Toward R.M. Constituted
Torture, Mischaracterizing Evidence, And Arguing Evidence For An Improper Purpose

41

L

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing That Certain Actions By
Mr. Ehrlick Toward R.M. Constituted Torture Although The Evidence Did Not
Comport With The Statutory Definition Of Torture

The State has asserted that the prosecutor's reliance on Dr. Keller's testimony regarding
actions that amounted to his definition of torture in closing argument is not error because a
prosecutor can rely upon admitted testimony in presenting closing argument

(Respondent's

Brief, pp.64-65.) The State continues that because Mr. Ehrlick did not supp011 this argument
with legal authority, the issue is not properly presented on appeal. Id. The State is correct that
Mr. Ehrlick did not present authority on that issue. However, such argument is not persuasive
because that is not the issue Mr. Ehrlick has raised on appeal. The prosecutorial misconduct
raised on appeal is not the reliance on the expert's testimony, but the prosecutor's disregard for,
and pervasive attempts to circumvent, Idaho's legal definition of "torture," and the prosecutor's
characterization of acts which do not meet that legal definition as provided to the jury. (R.,
p.1216.)

Mr. Ehrlick did present both authority and argument in support of his position.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.82-87.)
In the case at hand, the jury was instructed, consistently with the Idaho Code, that torture
is "the intentional infliction of extreme and prolonged pain with the intent to cause suffering and
or the infliction of extreme and prolonged acts of brutality." (R., p.1216.) Dr. Keller specifically
recognized that his definition of torture was different than the definition supplied by the Idaho
Code. (Tr., p.5093, L.14 - p.5096, L.12.) The prosecutor had a duty to argue that only actions
that amounted to torture under Idaho law were "t01iure," not to attempt to deceive the jury or
dupe them into believing that such actions were legally "torture" in Idaho because Dr. Keller had
labeled such actions as torture. (See State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, _ , 71 P. 608, 610 (1903)
(noting that the prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate
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inferences).
The State has argued that conduct which did not amount to the legal definition of torture
was still properly argued by the prosecution to show intent under I.C. § 18-4001. (Respondent's
Briet: p.65.) However, it is clear that such arguments were presented to convince the jury that
Mr. Ehrlick's actions amounted to torture, not to prove his intent in later completing alleged acts
that amount to torture under Idaho law. Mr. Ehrlick cited extensively to the State's improper
closing argument Appellant's Brief, and those citations are not repeated herein but are
incorporated by reference. (See Appellant's Briet: pp.84-85.) These citations show that the
prosecutor, repeated, directly and erroneously discussed what actions constitute "torture," not
mere "intent," and the State's appellate argument is without merit.
a.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Requires Vacation Of The Conviction

The State has argued that the jury was instructed on what the legal definition of torture
was and that because we presume that the jury follows jury instructions, Mr. Ehrlick has failed to
show prejudice. (Respondent's Brief, p.66.) However, the State has also noted that Dr. Keller's
testimony was admissible because it assisted the trier of fact in understanding a subject that is
"beyond the common sense, experience and education of the average juror."

(Respondent's

Brief, p.65 (citing to State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 81 (2007); l.R.E. 702; State v. Arrasmith, 132
Idaho 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998).) The State clearly believed that the average juror would not be
able to understand torture without an expert's testimony. Therefore, it logically follows that
there is a danger that the jury, although properly instructed on torture, may not understand the
instruction without assistance.

In the case at hand, the jury received ample assistance in

understanding what constituted "torture" from the prosecution. Unfortunately, that assistance led
to an incorrect interpretation of an element the jury was asked to find.

The prosecution's

assertions that Mr. Ehrlick's activities were "torture" encouraged the jury to reach a guilty
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verdict based on emotions attached to the concept of torture and an improper theory, rather than
the facts of the case and their proper application to the law. As such, it cannot be shown beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to Mr. Ehrlick's conviction. 12

2.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Misstating The Evidence Presented
At Trial

The State has asserted that there was no prosecutorial misconduct in argumg that
"Mr. Ehrlick' s admissions supported the inference that he caused the fatal injuries" to R.M.
(Respondent's Brief, p.67-68.) This argument is specious and mischaracterizes the actions of the
prosecutor. Although the State repeatedly asserts in its Respondent's Brief that the prosecutor
had "specifically" only argued that Mr. Ehrlick's admissions merely supported the "inference"
that he caused R.M. 's fatal injuries (id), the prosecutor specifically articulated that Mr. Ehrlick
had admitted to causing the fatal injuries. (Tr., p.6224, Ls.20-21 (Mr. Ehrlick "admitted to doing
things, doing the very things that would cause the injuries that [R.M.] died from."), p.6244, L.24
p.6245, L.2. ("He's admitting to doing things that would cause [R.M]'s fatal injuries,
specifically dropping the knees, something that you've heard about a lot."), p.6251, Ls.5-6 ("He
admitted that the fatal blows took place in the apartment."), p.6295, Ls.13-15 ("He told us that he
did those things or did things that would cause the injuries that [R.M.] suffered.").) Mr. Ehrlick
never made such admissions. (Tr., p.5582, L.22 - p.6145, L.l, p.6010, L.12 - p.6011, L.l,
p.6103, L.13 - p.6106, L.8; St. Ex. 12-4A - 12-lOA, 12-12A - 12-14A, 12-16A, 12-20A - 1222A (Audio Recording of Mr. Ehrlick's Interviews with police).) Despite the State's attempt to

12

The Appellant's Brief was organized in such a way that the hann for each alleged, unpreserved, prosecutorial
misconduct error was only briefly touched upon in the section related to the alleged error and this was followed by
the fundamental error review including an articulation of harm for each error in later sections. To the extent this
organizational style could be read as an assertion that the harm for the unpreserved error can be accumulated to
create a fundamental error, Mr. Ehrlick clarifies that was not his intention and he is not asserting such a cumulative
error argument. However, he maintains that if this Court finds that any of the asse1ted, unpreserved, prosecutorial
misconduct is found to be fundamental error that these errors and the preserved prosecutorial misconduct can then

44

characterize the prosecutor's comments as mere inferences, the statements are clear and
constitute a misstatement of the actual evidence presented at trial.

As such, these

misrepresentations of the evidence amount to prosecutorial misconduct.
3.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing Evidence For An Improper
Purpose

In support of its claim that Mr. Ehrlick misrepresents the record to support his argument

that there was no evidence presented that R.M. was limping on July 24, 2009, the State relies
upon evidence presented at trial showing that R.M. had been limping at some point.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.69-71.) The State fails, however, to comprehend that the issue was not
whether there was evidence that R.M. had a limp at some point in the past; rather, the issue was
whether R.M. was limping on July 24, 2009. Mr. Ehrlick never claimed. nor has he in this
appeal, that there was no evidence to support a conclusion that R.M. had been limping. He does
assert, however, that there was no evidence presented that R.M. was limping on July 24, 2009,
and, therefore, it was improper for the prosecutor to argue to the jury that R.M. was limping that
day.
The State premises its claim first upon following exchange occurring between Detective
Quilter and Mr. Ehrlick:
Det. Quilter: Okay? The timeline that we've been provided is not - it's not
working out. Okay? Because the timeline, it just isn't working. It isn't working
at all. [Ms. Jenkins] described that it was unlikely that he was outside very
much when she was away from work because he got hit in the ankle one time
and he'd been hobbling around on one leg because his ankle was hurt.
Mr. Ehrlick: No, his ankle was fine.
Det. Quilter: So is she making that up?
Mr. Ehrlick: Yeah.
be reviewed for cumulative error for the purposes of determining if the prosecutor was engaging in a pattern of
misbehavior. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70-71 (2011 ).
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Det. Quilter: Well, that seems like a pretty big thing to make up.
Mr. Ehrlick: Yeah.
Det. Quilter: Why would she make that up?
Mr. Ehrlick: He had an accident on his ankle, her, and he was hobbling on it
for a while but
Det. Quilter: Okay, So he was hobbling on his ankle.
Mr. Ehrlick: Yeah, for a while.
Det. Quilter: What was the accident?
Mr. Ehrlick: What's that?
Det. Quilter: The accident, what was that? Because she recalls a specific strike
to his leg
a stick.
Mr. Ehrlick: No, no.

was not it at all.

(Ex. pp.417-418 (emphasis added).) Detective Quilter told Mr. Ehrlick that he was trying to get
an accurate "timeline" together and that Ms. Jenkins told him that R.M. was limping -

Mr. Ehrlick specifically denied this. Id. Mr. Ehrlick only acknowledge R.M. had hobbled on his
ankle "for a while," and some undetermined time, and that it was not a result of being struck by a
stick
The State further asserts that Mr. Ehrlick's father testified that R.M. had a "'hard limp"'
starting in the beginning of summer. (Respondent's Brief, p.71 (citing Tr., p.4641, Ls.9-24).)
The State fails to acknowledge however, that Mr. Ehrlick Sr. was asked specifically, "Do you
recall, was that closer to the beginning of summer or closer to the time that [R.M.] was reported
missing," to which he responded, "The very beginning of summer." (Tr., p.4641, Ls.12-15.)
Thus, rather than supporting the State's assertion, Mr. Ehrlick Sr.' s testimony actually supports
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Mr. Ehrlick's claim that R.M. was limping at the beginning of the summer, and not on July 24,
2009, when he went missing, and there was no evidence presented to the contrary.
The State correctly notes that Mr. Ehrlick did not challenge two of the prosecutor's
statements made during closing argument. (Respondent's Brief, pp.69-70 (citing Tr., p.6324,
Ls.2-11; p.6421, L.16-p.6423, L.25.) Mr. Ehrlick did not challenge these statements as being
improperly based upon evidence not presented to the jury, because they were not based upon
evidence improperly presented to the jury. In the first statement, the prosecutor argued evidence
supporting their theory that R.M. was tortured, and did not refer to the ankle injury as being
present on July 24, 2009.

(Tr., p.6323, L.22

6331, L.4.)

In the second statement, the

prosecutor argued that Mr. Ehrlick was not being cooperative and failed to tell investigators that
R.M. was limping, which is something that people at the pool would have noticed. (Tr., p.6421,
L.16

p.6423, L.25.) This argument actually supports Mr. Ehrlick's claim that he never said

that R.M. was limping on July 24, 2009, and that the only evidence that he was limping that day
came in through Detective Quilter's statement to Mr. Ehrlick that Ms. Jenkins said he was
limping
L.22

evidence that could not be considered for the truth of the matter asserted. (Tr., p.1650,

p.1651, L.4; Tr., pp.11-23.) The State's argument is without merit.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Ehrlick respectfully requests that his judgments of conviction be vacated and his case
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 3 rd day of December, 2013.

JAS0N C. PINTLER
De/uty State Appellate

Defender
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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